The substance of the paper is as follows: Section I develops the basic two-period model, where pessimistic firms face a binding constraint on future demand (and, possibly, an irreversibility constraint on investment). A constrained social optimum is derived. Section II shows that the classical interest rate adjustment, which secures full employment and full capacity for the current period, achieves the constrained optimum. But in so doing, it is shown, factor prices must fall below their expected marginal productivities (unless the irreversibility constraint binds), and, as a result, prospective profits appear.
The next three sections analyse three competitive responses to prospective profits: (i) entry; (2) expenditures in pursuit of market share; and (3) arbitrage on the capital markets. Each of these three responses can dissipate the prospective profits which gave rise to them, but only by introducing inefficiencies. These are, respectively: (i) sacrifice of scale economies; (2) 'Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities', to use the term coined by Bhagwati (I982); and (3) high interest rates, which depress investment, and idle current resources in the Keynesian fashion depicted in Fig. I . Thus, the competitive pursuit of profits in a demand-constrained system leads to suboptimal configurations of one type or another (or some combination).
Perhaps the most interesting perspective which emerges from this analysis is that Keynesian unemployment and/or excess capacity can be understood as i986] DEMAND-CONSTRAINED MACRO MODEL 92I simply one of (at least) three types of inefficiencies which prevent profits from arising in situations of pessimistic expectations. These suboptimalities, it should be emphasised, are relative to the second-best optimum, constrained by pessimistic expectations of future demand. An appendix provides comparative static analyses of all the models in the paper with respect to expectations of future demand, under some simplifying assumptions, such as the imposition of a CES utility function. The optimality results, however, do not depend on these assumptions. In period I, all output is consumed, since there is no period 2:
F(K1, L1) = C1.
In restricting F, we recall the product exhaustion debate, which established that marginal productivity payments result in positive or negative profits as F observes decreasing or increasing returns to scale. Hence, for Walrasian zeroprofit (free entry) equilibrium to exist, F must observe constant returns over at least some portion of its domain. Classical macro models, then, typically simplify matters by assuming globally constant returns, unless the indeterminacy of individual firm size is a concern, in which case F is assumed to be dual to a U-shaped cost curve. In this Section, and Section II, we adopt the global CRS assumption, as usual, and then consider U-shaped cost curves in Section III. Of course, our focus is not Walrasian equilibrium, with marginal productivity payments, but demand-constrained equilibrium, where marginal productivity payments will not hold, so we will find a different relationship between returns to scale and profits. Now we assume firms perceive an aggregate demand constraint1 for period i, There are four possible cases, depending on which constraints, if any, bind. Of these, perhaps the least relevant case is the one where the irreversibility constraint binds, but the demand constraint does not. That is, it seems hard to imagine why an economy would like to disinvest, unless there is a demandinduced recession. Accordingly, we shall not consider this case any further.
Instead, we shall assume that if C is large, neither constraint binds; as C falls below the Walrasian level of C1, the demand constraint binds; and finally, as it falls further, demand-constrained investment falls below the irreversibility floor. The range we shall focus on most is the intermediate range, where the demand constraint binds, but not the irreversibility constraint. This would seem to cover a rather wide range, including not only 'growth' recessions, but also recessions where the typical firm is undertaking at least some replacement investment.
II. THE CLASSICAL SOLUTION IS OPTIMAL,

BUT GENERATES PROFITS
The previous section's solution to the constrained optimum was described without reference to market prices. In this Section we will show that the classical model of the determination of factor prices -the interest rate in particularsolves for the constrained optimum. However, we will also show that this solution generates profits over an important range of cases. According to the classical model, the consumer recognises no constraints other than the budget constraint -specifically, no involuntary unemployment. 
-UL1/UCU = W1,
UC0/UC = r1, 
The firm's investment and future labour demand are found by maximising prospective profits, 1JJ = F(K1,LI) -w1L,-r1Kl, with respect to both L1 and K1, subject to the relevant constraints, to be discussed. 
i.e. the wage times the marginal rate of technical substitution. It represents the reduction in labour costs from substituting capital, while meeting the fixed demand. Obviously, it declines with K, by convexity, as we move along the Cisoquant. Note that as we move along the investment demand curve, L1 increases with K1 over the unconstrained segment AB', then decreases over the constrained segment B'C'.1,2
When C is in Range (ii), the full-employment savings curve intersects the investment demand curve on its constrained segment, say at point C', so the classical interest rate is r' and investment is I'. The area under the investment demand, or marginal efficiency curve, AB'C' equals C-wL, so prospective profits, C-wL -rK, are given by the area of the trapezoid AB'C'D', which equals AC, from (i 2). The diagram is essentially the same as the textbook 1 The kink in the investment demand curve is smoothed out when risk is introduced, as in Costrell (1983) .
2 The profit-maximising variations in L as we move along the investment demand curve contrast with the dubious constructions of some writers, e.g. Branson (1972, pp. 208-I ) . In these constructions L is held constant at some unspecified level. Therefore, either that L is not maximising profits, given w, or else w is presumed to vary as we move along the investment demand curve. Either one violates the assumption of price-taking, profit-maximising firms.
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[DECEMBER diagram I a, with the important difference that our formal analysis has shown the curve to be perfectly elastic over the region where the demand constraint does not bind. When the constraint does bind, an inframarginal area (it is a trapezoid, rather than a triangle) materialises, because the classical interest rate must fall below the marginal productivity of capital to stimulate sufficient investment to absorb full-employment savings.1 Range (iii): C falls so low that in addition to the demand constraint, the irreversibility constraint binds as well, A, 0 > o. Here, the marginal efficiency curve shifts to AB'C"E", intersecting the full-employment savings curve at negative gross investment. The irreversibility constraint forces the firm to invest nothing, so the full-employment interest rate is r". Here, the trapezoid AB"C"D" again equals AC, what profits would be if negative investment were allowed at that interest rate. However, the firm's profits are reduced by the area of the triangle C"r"E", which equals 58KO, the loss from carrying more capital than the firm would like (i.e. the excess of the extra interest cost over the further reduction in labour costs). As depicted, prospective profits are still positive, AC > 58KO, but with further reductions in C, they would go negative. The relationship between C and prospective profits, covering the three ranges discussed, is summarised in Fig. 3 . As we leave Range (i), the demand constraint binds, so A becomes positive and profits appear. They may reach a maximum in Range (ii), as depicted, before the irreversibility constraint binlds, since the reduction in C may offset the rise in A within this range. Still, profits certainly remain positive throughout Range (ii). It is only after we get into Range (iii), where the irreversibility constraint binds, that the fixed costs of carrying unwanted capital eventually drive prospective profits negative.
This analysis may appear somewhat paradoxical, since entrepreneurial pessimism is typically identified with losses, not profits. Indeed, we view this paradox as a serious problem with the classical model, and its result of constrained optimality. This model generates prospective profits because it assumes Competitive analysis informs us that prospective profits invite entry. Of course, if constant returns prevail globally, the number of firms is irrelevant, so entry has no real effect on the economy's aggregates. It behooves us, then, to relax the assumption of global CRS in favour of the more acceptable assumption of variable returns to scale, associated with U-shaped cost curves. In this section we will first establish that the optimum conditions for such a model now include the proviso that each firm operate at a point of constant returns. Then we will show that the classical interest rate model only achieves that condition in the unconstrained case; if the demand constraint binds, the classical interest rate yields prospective profits at points of CRS, so entry occurs, reducing firm size, and driving firms back up their cost curves into the region of increasing returns. In this way, a zero-profit equilibrium may be established, with full employment, but at the cost of lost scale economies. To keep the analysis focused on resolving the paradox of countercyclical profits, we confine our attention to Ranges (i) and (ii) of C, such that the irreversibility constraint does not bind. The appendix to this section provides a more formal demonstration that dn/dC < o in the vicinity of the Walrasian solution, quite the opposite of the optimal response of n, as well as one's casual impressions. Thus, with variable returns to scale, free entry eliminates the paradox of countercyclical prospective profits, but only by introducing a new paradox, of countercyclical firm population. The appendix shows further paradoxes as well. If the elasticity of substitution between current and future leisure and consumption is less than unity, then investment and employment are countercyclical, as the income effects of pessimism lead consumers to reduce leisure (increasing employment) and current consumption (increasing savings and investment). In any case, it can also be shown (details available upon request) that investment and employment are greater than in the constrained optimum, as resources are used inefficiently in producing C at too small a scale. The mechanism just described gives us the Keynesian result that the interest rate need not adjust to equilibrate investment to full-employment, full-capacity savings, and we get this result without resorting to liquidity traps or wage/price inflexibility. Formally, the arbitrage (zero-profit) condition provides an additional equation to the classical system (i)-(2), (6)-(I I), which is inconsistent with it, according to (i 2). Following Keynesian analysis, high interest rates depress investment and, hence, current employment, so (6) and/or (9) fail, leaving unemployment and/or excess capacity. In this way, pessimism about the future spills over into perceived constraints in the present, by workers and/or firms. Of course, this means the optimality condition (3) also fails, 
solve for CO, Lo, L1, K1, wl, and rl. Note that the quantity of current employment is determined by this system, even though the current wage is not (since we have dropped both (6) and (9)). concerns are the quantities (hence, efficiency), and also the interest rate, not the current wage rate. The behaviour of the interest rate is illustrated in the loanable funds diagram, Fig. 2 . In a demand-constrained regime, the classical, full-employment interest rate is depicted at C'. The zero-profit equilibrium, however, requires a higher interest rate, which depresses investment. In Keynesian fashion, current employment is depressed as well, shifting the savings curve left until it intersects the marginal efficiency curve at B',1 eliminating the inframarginal trapezoid.
To summarise, then, the Keynesian mechanism does avoid the paradox of countercyclical profits, raised by the basic classical model of Section II. Furthermore, the appendix shows that in the Keynesian model, investment and current employment are unambiguously procyclical, as we would expect, unlike the zero-profit classical models of Sections III and IV. Finally, it can be shown that the Keynesian model gives us lower investment and current employment than in the constrained optimum, unlike the previous models. As C falls, the future wage and interest rate must both fall to induce consumers to enjoy more future leisure and current consumption.
